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Introduction 
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and foreign relations has 
been under debate since the creation of the EU’s predecessor, the European Economic 
Community (EEC), in 1957. At that time the EEC’s role in international politics was 
admittedly minimal; however, as time passed and the EU officially came into being, 
expanding not only geographically but also in influence, the EU has played an 
increasingly larger role on the world stage. This increased participation in world issues, 
not as individual countries, but as a whole entity has forced the EU to create common 
positions on foreign policy. This process of determining and carrying out these common 
decisions will be the focus of this thesis. My research questions are: How do the foreign 
policy strategies and methods used by the European Union to deal with international 
crises differ between issues that are close to home and those that are more removed? 
How and why are these strategies developed?  
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A Brief History of the Foreign Policy of the European Union 
Although the European Union, as we know and understand it today, was not 
fully formed until 1992, the European community has been working toward 
collaboration on foreign policy issues since the 1950s. Originally, this collaboration was 
a reaction to the events of both World Wars. During this time, many countries were 
concerned about the power of Germany and the threat that it could present to 
surrounding countries. These concerns led to the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community between West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxemburg in 1951. The motivation for this early attempt at European unification was 
the prevention of war by limiting arms production that could be used against one 
another (“The History of the European Union”). One year later, a step towards direct 
collaboration on military and strategic issues was taken with the proposal to constitute 
the European Defense Community (EDC). This failed to become a reality, however 
because of the inability of the French to secure parliamentary approval. Instead, the 
European Economic Community (EEC) was created in 1957 to extend collaboration in 
trade matters (Federiga 2010).  
The EEC was originally made up of the same six countries as the European Coal 
and Steel Community, and has become known as the precursor to the modern European 
Union. Although it was essentially an economic union, it went beyond trade agreements 
among individual countries and achieved a common commercial policy where the EEC 
would represent all of the participating countries on external trade matters. This event 
marks the first time where the European countries clearly formed a common position on 
an issue and then gave up direct control of that issue to the EEC.  The EEC also 
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introduced the idea of enlargement, which would become one of the main factors in 
foreign policy relations, internally and externally, for the European Union in later years. 
Enlargement is the process by which countries can become members of the EEC, or 
later the EU. Since the time of the European Coal and Steel Community, the number of 
countries has increased through this process from six to twenty-eight. Following the 
creation of the EEC, not much progress in terms of foreign relations was made for a 
little over a decade until 1970. In that year, European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
institutionalized consultations on foreign policy issues (Federiga 2010). A few years 
later, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the EEC, an event that 
contributed to the creation of the Copenhagen Report that articulated a new foreign 
policy direction among the now nine member states (“The History of the European 
Union”). This report called for a meeting of the foreign affairs ministers at least four 
times a year to discuss policy or any foreign relations situations that come up. Later that 
same year, the EEC issued the Declaration on European Identity, which served to 
“better define the EEC’s relations and responsibilities to the rest of the world and the 
place they occupied in world affairs” (Federiga 2010: 21). With this declaration, the 
EEC stated that it intended to work toward a common foreign policy goal. This move 
toward a more defined and integrated stance on issues of foreign policy became more of 
a focus in 1981 when “member states . . . pushed for the reform of the EPC in order to 
make it more effective and ensure more active participation of the European 
Community in international affairs.” (Federiga 2010: 23). During this time an overhaul 
of the EPC did indeed take place through the London Report in late 1981, which more 
clearly defined and elaborated on the functions of the EPC as a whole as well as the 
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meetings of the foreign affairs ministers. Five years later, these changes were 
formalized and institutionalized in the Single European Act (SEA), which stressed the 
importance of intergovernmental cooperation in foreign affairs (Federiga 2010).  
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed, officially replacing the EEC with the 
European Union. The Maastricht Treaty also marked a major change in the EU’s 
approach to foreign policy by creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). The CFSP serves as one of the three pillars of the EU; beside the CFSP, the 
other pillars are the European Communities, and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), as 
laid down in the pillar structure by the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP provides the 
framework for the EU’s approach to foreign affairs today (Bache, George, and Bulmer 
2011: 515). Although it mostly focused on economic foreign policy issues, the CFSP 
also laid out policy for many other issues, such as financial assistance to third world 
countries. The most recent important change to the EU’s approach to foreign policy 
occurred in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. The Treaty of Lisbon merged the previous 
three pillar system into one and created the European External Action Services (EEAS), 
the EU’s diplomatic arm, and the position of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (a position that merged those of the High 
Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European 
Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighborhood Policy) (“The 
History of the European Union”). These changes served as the last major revamp of the 
EU’s structure pertaining to foreign policy issues (“External Relations”).  
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European Union Foreign Policy Today 
Foreign policy in the European Union today is a very complex and a rather 
obscure process. While this statement can easily apply to the nature of foreign policy in 
general, it applies especially to the EU, which does not have the same level of cohesive 
functioning as most states. The provisions laid out in the Treaty of Lisbon, specifically 
through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), largely dictate the current 
foreign policy in the EU. The CFSP functions under the High Representative who 
serves as “a bridge between external economic relations and the CFSP/ESDP,” with the 
European External Action Services (EEAS) as support (Bache, George, and Bulmer 
2011: 515). The changes to the CFSP aimed to extend “the role and responsibilities of 
this post [the high representative] in the Lisbon Treaty were indicative of a desire to 
reduce the gap by increasing the 'actorness' of the EU” (Bache, George, and Bulmer 
2011: 526). However, this desire to increase the ability of the EU to play a role as an 
actor in international relations is countered by the desires of individual states to 
maintain their sovereignty and control over foreign policy decisions.  
Given this state of affairs, the actors and bodies involved in deciding foreign 
policy in the EU are numerous and varied. First there are the ‘official’ actors, or those 
who are assigned to this role in some formal capacity. These include the High 
Representative, the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), the EEAS, the Council, and 
the Commission. The High Representative, currently Federica Mogherini (2014-2019), 
essentially serves as a manager and coordinator, while steering the foreign policy of the 
EU and working for consensus between the member states on foreign policy issues 
(“EU Special Representatives”). The EUSRs serve as diplomats in countries around the 
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world, promoting the EU’s policies and interests as well as encouraging peace and 
stability in troubled regions. As the EU’s diplomatic service, the EEAS works to carry 
out the policies of the CFSP. It encompasses many different positions, including those 
of the High Representative and the EUSRs (“About the European External Action 
Service [EEAS]). (For a full comprehension of the structure of the EEAS see Figure 5)  
As the primary legislative body of the EU, the Commission has as its primary 
role in foreign affairs, the implementation of laws and controls that encourage and 
facilitate the creation of foreign policy goals. Recently, the Commission has taken a 
particular interest in the state of foreign affairs in the EU, setting as one of its main 
priorities for this year as serving as a strong global actor. In order to achieve this goal, 
the President of the Commission stated: “I intend to entrust other external relations 
Commissioners with the task of deputising for the High Representative both within the 
work of the College and on the international stage” (Juncker 2014: 10).  
The Council sets the EU’s political policy agenda by adopting ‘conclusions’ that 
indicate the concerns of the EU members and responses to them. This process applies to 
setting and directing foreign policy as well as to other policy issues. The role of the EU 
as a global actor is one of the current top five priorities of the Council (“What Does the 
Council of the EU do? 2015). It works together with the other groups to create foreign 
policy. For example, in the case of Ukraine a news article indicates this cooperation, 
stating: “It is understood the European Commission and the EU's foreign policy arm, 
the European External Action Service, are continuing to work on the various options for 
such sanctions, and what the Russian response to each would be” (Price 2014). 
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There are also actors involved that are not specifically assigned to the task of 
determining the EU’s foreign policy; namely, the 28 European Union member states 
themselves. While these countries are represented in the Commission and Council in 
different ways, they also have the ability to be independent actors in the foreign affairs 
of the EU as a whole. This reality applies specifically to the most powerful and 
influential countries in the EU, which are generally the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany. If one, or especially more than one, of these countries takes a strong stance 
on an issue, they can not only pressure other EU countries into taking similar steps, but 
also partially guide the direction of the EU as a whole. This process is more prevalent in 
some cases than others. For example, in the current crisis in Syria there has been a great 
division of opinion over some decisions regarding sanctions and restrictive measures. 
According to BBC, on one side, “Britain and France had been pressing for the ability to 
send weapons to what they call moderate opponents of President Assad, saying it would 
push Damascus towards a political solution to the two-year conflict” (“EU Ends Arms 
Embargo on Syrian Refugees” 2013), while on the opposing side “other countries had 
opposed opening the way for weapons to be sent, saying it would only worsen the 
violence” (“EU Ends Arms Embargo on Syrian Refugees” 2013). In the end the 
argument presented by Britain and France prevailed, showing the power and sway that 
EU countries such as these two can have over others in an unofficial capacity.  
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Case Study: The Ukrainian Crisis (2013-Present) 
Ukraine serves as a good case study because it is a country that has close ties, 
not only to many European countries, but also to the EU as a whole. The recent crisis in 
Ukraine has drawn international attention and has no doubt had effects on the EU’s 
relations not only with other countries but also with several international organizations. 
Since Ukraine is generally considered to be a part of Europe, specifically Eastern 
Europe, the crisis can thus be considered a ‘European issue’. Therefore, one would 
expect the European Union to be involved with this issue. Ukraine is also a country that 
has been seeking a closer and more integrated relationship with the EU for a long time. 
For these reasons, Ukraine offers a useful example of the EU’s manner of addressing 
foreign issues in two ways: first, how the EU forms foreign policy in light of a situation 
that it would be and is expected to deal with, and second, the geographical proximity of 
Ukraine which it cannot ignore. 
European Union-Ukrainian Relations (1998-2013) 
The basis of EU-Ukrainian relations is the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement that entered into force in 1998. In this agreement, four objectives were laid 
out. These were encouragement of political dialogue; promotion of trade, investment, 
and harmonious economic relations; enabling economic, social, financial, civil, 
scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation; and assistance in the development of 
Ukraine’s democracy and market economy (“Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” 
1998). EU foreign policy toward Ukraine has generally followed the same path for 
years, with both sides making various steps toward greater integration. When describing 
their foreign policy goals in regards to Ukraine, the EU website states: “The European 
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Union and Ukraine share an objective which transcends bilateral cooperation: gradual 
progress towards political association and economic integration” (“The EU's Relations 
with Ukraine”). These goals are reflected in the policy currently in place. For example, 
many of the agreements with Ukraine currently deal with the creation of a free trade 
area with Ukraine and financial assistance from the EU.  
 EU-Ukraine relations have been largely defined by the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP) and by the enlargement process. As part of the ENP, Ukraine has been the 
subject of an action plan that has defined its relations with the EU for some time (“The 
EU's Relations with Ukraine”). Additionally, the country has felt the effects of the 
enlargement of the EU and has desired to become a part of that process since the mid-
1990s. In 2009, the Eastern Partnership, a denomination of the ENP that refers 
specifically to Eastern European countries, brought Ukraine into the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and led to the negotiation of an Association Agreement in 
the period between 2007 and 2011. The Association Agreement is a type of 
arrangement that the EU sets out with each country (or sometimes group of countries) 
that is part of the ENP as a way to structure how the parties will interact. However, 
prior to the start of the Ukrainian crisis, the agreement had not been signed. In fact, 
President Yanukovych had refused to sign it in 2013, instead favoring a trade deal with 
Russia. This decision is the crux of the current conflict in Ukraine.  
The Crisis in Ukraine (2013-Present) 
The current crisis in Ukraine began around November 2013 when the Ukrainian 
President Viktor Yanukovych refused to make a trade deal with the European Union, 
instead closing a deal with Russia over gas debt. Many of the citizens in Ukraine did not 
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support the move and protests began in the capital, Kiev. By December over 800,000 
people had joined a demonstration against the decision in Kiev (See Figure 1). With the 
protests still going strong in January, Yanukovych passed several laws restricting the 
right to protest. Frustration over these laws turned violent and protestors clashed with 
police, causing the law to be repealed only eleven days after it entered into force. This 
violence reached its tipping point in Kiev on February 20th, 2014, when the police once 
again clashed with protestors. BBC comments: “Kiev sees its worst day of violence for 
almost 70 years. At least 88 people are killed in 48 hours” (“Ukraine Crisis: Timeline” 
2014). Only two days later, the death count had reached 100 people and the government 
essentially collapsed with the disappearance of President Yanukovych. At this point, an 
interim president, Oleksandr Turchynov, was elected by parliament to serve until the 
May 2014 elections.  
Previous to this point, the conflict had taken the form of violence between pro-
European protestors and government forces, such as the police. However, in the period 
between Turchynov taking office in late February and the scheduled elections in May, 
Russia voted to send troops to Crimea, an area of land that Russia and Ukraine had been 
feuding over for some time. The Ukrainian government considered this a declaration of 
war and sought support from the UN, the US, and the EU. However, in March a 
referendum was held in Crimea and the voters opted overwhelmingly to leave Ukraine 
and become a part of Russia. Most countries and international organizations considered 
this outcome highly suspicious, if not outright fraudulent. At this point the EU began to 
interfere actively in the situation. This is also when the conflict began that can be seen 
now between the pro-European Ukrainian government and military and pro-Russian 
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separatists. The initial trigger for this fight occurred on March 18th, 2014, when masked 
gunmen took over a base in Crimea, killing one member of Ukraine’s military and 
wounding another. This event prompted the Ukrainian government to authorize the use 
of deadly force to combat other such attempts. What followed was a series of similar 
incidents. This included the Russian and pro-Russian forces taking over an airbase, a 
military base, and a Ukrainian ship. By April, the conflict had turned into a civil war, 
with the pro-Russian rebels taking control of more than 10 cities in Donetsk, a region in 
Eastern Ukraine. 
When the election came around in May, many people in Ukraine hoped that it 
would bring about a positive change. However, the violence only continued to escalate 
after the election of the new president, Petro Poroshenko. Since his election, the conflict 
has become more militarized, with the Ukrainian army clashing with the armed and 
equipped pro-Russian separatist rebels. Suspicions that Russia has been supplying the 
rebels with equipment and troops have caused tension between the two countries 
(“Ukraine Crisis: Timeline” 2014). The violence in Eastern Ukraine continued, 
culminating in a commercial airline being shot down by a surface-to-air missile in July. 
Since then there have been two attempts at a ceasefire between the two forces, one in 
September and the other in February. These, however, have not been fully successful 
(“Ukraine Fast Facts” 2015).  
Issues of Concern to the European Union in Ukraine 
The real question to consider before looking at what actions the EU has taken in 
response to the situation in Ukraine is: why is the situation in Ukraine a concern for the 
EU? There are several answers to this question; however, essentially there are three 
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issues: the power and influence of Russia, instability, and European foreign relations 
issues such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, enlargement, and the status of 
Europe as a region.  
The power and influence of Russia has been a concern in Europe for over a 
century, but has become more focused following the creation of the EU. Ukraine, much 
like other Eastern European countries, has traditionally been seen as the connecting 
border between Western Europe and Russia. This is even more so the situation today; 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova are now the only three countries not directly aligned 
with Europe, as part of the EU, or with Russia. Of these three countries, “Ukraine is the 
biggest frontier nation separating Russia and the EU” (Gumuchian 2014). Given its 
location, Ukraine has often been seen as a means to an end for both the EU and Russia. 
A news source comments, “Ukraine is something of a pawn between Russia and the 
West. For the West . . . its reach would spread further east; by contrast, the Russians see 
the Ukraine as key to holding on to their turf” (Gumuchian 2014). The Russians have 
also expressed concern that the US push for more North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) activity on the Russian-Ukrainian border will bring Ukraine closer to the West. 
This concern is far from unfounded as one article points out “Since Russia’s reunion 
with Crimea and the start of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine last spring, NATO 
forces have stepped up military exercises along the Russian border – in the Baltic States 
and Eastern Europe” (“NATO activity near Russian borders increased by 80% – 
General Staff” 2015). Thus, Ukraine has been the center of a figurative tug-of-war 
between the US, European powers, and Russia since Ukraine declared itself an 
independent nation in the 1990s. Neither group wants the other to achieve its goal. 
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Therefore, Russia taking control of Ukraine, either in whole or in part, has been a major 
concern of the EU.  
The current conflict in Ukraine has shown that these concerns are far from 
unfounded. Early in the conflict many legislative changes were made by the temporary 
Ukrainian government under the advisement of Russia, restricting freedoms such as the 
right to protest and the right of free speech. These restrictions were followed by other 
legislation proposed by a pro-Russian legislator, which “introduced a number of laws 
that closely resembled Russian models” (Snyder 2014). As the conflict continued, 
Russia became more and more involved, going from subtly influencing policy to 
sending troops to occupy Crimea, to sending weapons to the pro-separatist rebels.  
President Obama, during a speech in Brussels, articulated the West’s concern over this 
issue. In that speech, Obama condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine, arguing that such 
coordination by the US and EU was necessary “‘not because we're trying to keep Russia 
down, but because the principles that have meant so much to Europe and the world must 
be upheld’” (Smith-Spark 2014).  
Another issue is the general instability of the region affecting other European 
countries and the EU itself. For the last 11 years (8 years for Romania), the four EU 
member countries bordering Ukraine have created and nurtured ties with each other. 
Instability in this area can have a direct effect on these countries and, by extension, the 
EU as a whole. As the situation in Ukraine has become increasingly volatile, the EU has 
become increasingly concerned about violence and its consequences. At the beginning 
of the conflict, the situation in Ukraine was described as follows: 
“For the past few weeks, billowing smoke, large fires, burnt out tires and 
cars as well as smashed windows of public buildings have become 
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familiar scenes in the snowy city as protests have plunged Ukraine, an 
eastern European country of 45 million people, into a deep political 
crisis. 
Some of the images beamed around the world have been particularly 
dramatic -- protesters knocking down a giant statue of the Russian 
revolutionary leader Vladimir Lenin and hacking it with hammers to 
loud cheers, explosions reminiscent of a war zone echoing around 
downtown Kiev, fierce clashes and abuse. One protester, naked aside 
from his shoes, was seen being kicked and forced onto a police bus” 
(Gumuchian 2014). 
 
Already in those first few weeks of the conflict, the instability of the region became 
evident. The news source continued to comment on how the situation had been 
“drawing concern from its neighbors” (Gumuchian 2014), especially from the EU. An 
EU representative commented on this matter, stating: "‘ We are frightened, in the east of 
Ukraine, not only for Donetsk and Luhansk and not only for Ukraine, but also for the 
safety and security of the European Union’” (“Ukraine: EU Fails to Agree on New 
Russia Sanctions” 2014). These concerns became even greater once it became apparent 
that Russia intended to send troops to Crimea and later to supply pro-separatist rebels 
with weapons and other supplies. By this point, not only was the country itself unstable, 
but the quantity of weapons available to escalate the conflict and the level of destruction 
had also increased. For example, at one point “up to 90 military trucks with rocket 
launchers and other weapons were seen passing through rebel held areas of eastern 
Ukraine . . . Ukrainian military reported an ‘intensive deployment’ of troops and 
equipment crossing the border from Russia into the east of the country” (“Ukraine 
Crisis: Rebel Elections Obstacle to Peace – EU” 2014). This deployment of troops and 
weapons increased the instability of the situation both physically and politically. At this 
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point the conflict was no longer limited to within the borders of Ukraine, but included 
Russia, a greater power that interfered directly in the Ukrainian situation.  
The level of instability, both physical and political, in Eastern Ukraine also led 
to mass displacement; “Some 5.2 million people live in conflict-affected areas and 1.4 
million are considered ‘highly vulnerable and in need of assistance’. More than a 
million people have fled their homes, with 633,523 living as displaced persons within 
Ukraine and 593,622 living outside Ukraine, mostly in Russia” (“Ukraine Conflict: EU 
Weighs more Sanctions on Russia” 2015). These numbers speak only to the number of 
people forced to flee their homes due to the conflict; they do not address the numbers of 
those who have been injured or killed in the course of the conflict. According to BBC, 
over 5,000 had been killed and over 10,300 had been injured (“Ukraine Conflict: EU 
Weighs more Sanctions on Russia” 2015). Having such a large number of displaced, 
injured, and dead led to challenges in housing and caring for these people. While most 
of this burden seems to have fallen on Russia and the government of Ukraine rather 
than on the EU directly, the EU has played a part in assisting Ukraine with facing these 
challenges.  
Besides causing problems physically, politically, and logistically, instability has 
led to issues concerning the distribution of resources, especially gas. As a main supplier 
of gas to both Ukraine and the EU, Russia shut off gas to Ukraine, and by extension to 
the EU as a whole. There are several gas lines that run from Russia into Europe; 
however, one of the largest of these runs directly through Ukraine, and this the one that 
has been most affected (See Figure 2). While this source is only one of several that 
services Ukraine and the EU, it makes up a significant portion of their access to the 
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product. According to news sources, 50% of Ukraine’s gas comes from Russia, while 
about one third of the EU’s gas comes from Russia, about ½ of which is pumped 
through Ukraine. At least one sixth of normal gas levels depend on this transit through 
Ukraine. As a main source of heat during the winter for both Ukraine and other EU 
countries, gas is an issue of special concern to Europe. In fact, if the problem were to go 
unsolved, Ukraine would have a “winter shortfall of around 3 billion to 4 billion cubic 
meters of gas, analysts say” (“Russia-Ukraine Gas Deal Secures EU Winter Supply 
2014). This shortfall would consequently affect the supplies of gas available to the EU, 
leading to the possibility that many Europeans would not be able to heat their homes 
throughout the winter.  
The final point of concern for the EU is the manner in which these issues will 
affect the state of EU foreign relations through specific EU policies and Europe’s status. 
Since Ukraine declared itself an independent state in the early 1990s, it has shown an 
increasing interest in being more closely aligned with Europe, a desire eventually 
manifesting in a declared intention to work to join the EU. The EU has generally 
greeted this desire favorably, but without actively encouraging it. Agreements with 
Ukraine, such as its place in the ENP, tie it to Europe and the EU, while still keeping 
the country from becoming completely integrated with the it. The most recent conflict 
and Russia’s interest and actions in Ukraine have upset the previous balance, and now 
the EU may be forced into reevaluating Ukraine’s place in Europe and their policies 
toward the country. The forces for joining Europe and those for joining Russia are 
tearing the country apart, and eventually a decision one way or the other will have to be 
made or the country will remain in its current state of limbo, furthering its current civil 
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war. When that decision is made, both Russia and Europe will have to be prepared to 
adjust to the consequences.  
The European Union Response to the Ukrainian Crisis 
How has the EU chosen to address the crisis in Ukraine? The process of 
deciding what to do in response to the situation in Ukraine has been far from easy or 
straightforward for the EU. At several points throughout the process their indecision has 
been clear. According to one article, “EU governments are deeply divided about taking 
action against Russia” (“Ukraine: EU Fails to Agree on New Russia Sanctions” 2014). 
Shortly thereafter, it was reported that within the EU there “was no agreement on how 
to respond to Russia's actions in Ukraine” (“Ukraine: EU Fails to Agree on New Russia 
Sanctions” 2014). This confusion over what should be done has certainly slowed the 
decision process and has affected the kinds of actions taken in response to the Ukrainian 
crisis. However, despite these challenges, the EU has taken an unprecedented role in the 
crisis. As of early April 2015, the EU’s actions in Ukraine have included sanctions on 
pro-separatist Ukrainian and Russian officials, providing monetary assistance to the 
government of Ukraine, serving as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia, providing 
on-the-ground help through a European Union Action Mission (EUAM), and putting in 
motion changes to the ENP and Association Agreement.  
The first step taken by the EU as a whole in response to the situation in Ukraine 
and Russia’s role in the crisis was to impose sanctions. These have covered a wide 
range of areas and people, but have focused primarily on people supporting the pro-
separatist rebels and businesses or areas of the economy important to Russia. The 
sanctions have become progressively more numerous since the beginning of the 
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conflict. Currently, “150 persons and 37 entities are subject to an asset freeze and a 
travel ban over their responsibility for actions which undermine or threaten the 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine” (“EU Restrictive 
Measures in Response to the Crisis in Ukraine” 2015). These sanctions cover a wide 
variety of people in both Ukraine and Russia and include visa bans, asset freezes, and 
limited access to EU capital markets. Most of these sanctions are in response to actions 
that the EU did not approve of. For example, sanctions were placed on people involved 
in the misappropriation of state funds in Ukraine in order to discourage such behavior. 
As the conflict continued, more sanctions were added not on individuals but on 
sectors of trade or geographic areas. Additionally, several other areas faced restriction. 
These included blocking new arms contracts between Europe and Russia, prohibiting 
the export of European military goods and similar items, limiting the export of energy-
related equipment, restricting the loans on Russian state banks, and blocking defense-
related technology exports and certain Russian oil industry exports. The geographical 
areas of Crimea and Sevastopol have been a particular focus of sanctions. Among these 
have been import bans on goods, a complete ban on investment, and a prohibition on 
the provision of tourism services to the area. These sanctions were a response to the 
EU’s disapproval of the annexation of the area by Russia (“EU Restrictive Measures in 
Response to the Crisis in Ukraine” 2015).  
The main purpose of these sanctions has been to change the course of the crisis 
in Ukraine through influencing those supporting or perpetuating it. CNN commented: 
“The United States and EU are seeking to exert pressure on Russia through a 
combination of sanctions and diplomatic isolation” (Smith-Spark, Brumfield, and 
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Krever 2014). As this quote demonstrates, the main goal of the EU is to pressure Russia 
into doing what the EU wants. However, what the EU seeks from Russia in response to 
these sanctions is continuously changing. Sanctions are used primarily for two 
purposes: to threaten the subjects of the sanctions against taking a certain action or to 
punish the subject for failing to complete an action, or for participating in one that is not 
acceptable. At one point, the EU’s end game was apparently the use of sanctions as a 
means of inducing Russia to stop aggravating the conflict in Ukraine. According to one 
news source, the “EU and the United States have repeatedly warned Moscow that more 
economic sanctions could be imposed if it doesn't act to defuse the crisis” (Smith-Spark, 
Almasy, and Walsh 2014). In its statement regarding the sanctions, the EU Council 
specifies that these are “‘meant as a strong warning: Illegal annexation of territory and 
deliberate destabilization of a neighboring sovereign country cannot be accepted in 21st 
century Europe" (Smith-Spark, Almasy, and Walsh 2014). Here, the EU’s concern over 
issues such as instability and the image of ‘Europe’ is clear and is used to provide a 
rationale for threatening to impose sanctions on Russia as a consequence of further 
military action by Russia in Ukraine. Unfortunately, in this case the sanctions did not 
seem to have the desired effect, as noted in a subsequent article “Despite previous 
sanctions, the flow of weapons continues and on Tuesday the fighting appeared to have 
entered a dangerous new phase” (Smith-Spark, Almasy, and Walsh 2014).  
Since the realization that using sanctions in a threatening manner as a warning 
against future bad behavior had failed, the EU turned to using sanctions more as a 
method of punishment. This method first became evident in the aftermath of the Flight 
17 crash, when the sanctions were described by some as showing “a waning patience 
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with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the impact of the shoot-down of Malaysia 
Airlines Flight 17” (Smith-Spark, Almasy, and Walsh 2014). The crash of Flight 17 
illustrated one of the main concerns of the EU in regards to the Ukrainian crisis: 
instability. Many Europeans died in this crash in Eastern Ukraine, providing the first 
major example of the crisis physically bleeding over into the EU.  
However, even as the EU began to issue harsher sanctions, some EU member 
states expressed concern over the effects of such sanctions on their own economies, 
some even going so far as to actively oppose the sanctions. As these two ideas 
converged, the actual sanctions that were imposed by the EU took such concerns into 
account. Concerns over economic backlash were greatest for Germany, France, Britain, 
and Italy. More generally, trade was a major concern. As CNN commented: “The 
European Union had previously been reluctant to issue harsher sanctions against Russia 
because both regions rely on one another for about $500 billion in trade and investment 
each year” (Smith-Spark, Almasy, and Walsh 2014). By restricting trade and business 
between themselves and Russia, European countries ran the risk of hurting their own 
economies as well as Russia’s. For this reason, the economic effects of sanctions on 
individual countries have to be balanced accordingly:  
“Germany could be hit by Moscow because of its reliance on Russian 
energy supplies. France could suffer because of a deal to supply Moscow 
with two navy ships worth 1.2 bn euros to the struggling French 
economy. Britain is nervous because so much Russian money is tied up 
in London's financial sector. All are vulnerable. As are many smaller EU 
states” (Price 2014).  
Such concerns on the part of some of the largest EU countries remain in the background 
of all decisions regarding sanctions. Smaller countries also speak out strongly over their 
own concerns. For example, Italy was strongly opposed to EU sanctions on Russia. One 
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member of the European Parliament (MEP) from Italy’s Northern League, Gianluca 
Buonanno, who was present at a vote regarding sanctions, was seen “wearing a T-shirt 
bearing the slogan ‘No sanctions against Russia’ on top of his suit in order to make his 
point” (Morris 2014). These concerns and disagreements among the EU member 
countries have limited the scope of sanctions. The sanctions have not been small scale. 
Holistically, they have affected almost every sector of Russian society, and the EU has 
not been reluctant to seek out people or institutions on which sanctions should be 
imposed. One article reports, “EU foreign ministers asked officials to put forward 
names of pro-Russian separatists to be added to the EU's sanctions list by the end of the 
month” (“Ukraine: EU Fails to Agree on New Russia Sanctions” 2014).  
Beyond sanctions, another step that has been taken by the EU has been to 
provide support through monetary assistance to the government of Ukraine. The choice 
to provide this kind of assistance comes from two main sources: international pressure 
and the needs of the Ukrainian government. Since the onset of the crisis the main 
conflict at issue for Ukrainians has been whether to align themselves economically with 
Russia or the EU. As both the EU and Russia have interest in the area, in the end the 
Ukrainian government will have to decide whether it wants to align itself more closely 
to the East or the West. For this reason, the needs of Ukraine hold weight in the EU 
foreign policy decision-making process. For example, in light of the recent crisis, 
Ukraine is in desperate need of funds for a variety of purposes, something that the trade 
deal offered by Russia provides. Therefore, “with Ukraine desperately in need of a cash 
injection, Kiev cited the need for financial assistance if it were to do business with the 
EU” (Gumuchian 2014). This stipulation by the Ukrainian government is paired with 
 22 
 
international awareness of the financial needs of Ukraine and a push to meet them to 
some degree.  
Several different types of possible aid have been discussed, ranging from loans 
to free trade agreements to microcredits to visa-free travel for normal Ukrainians 
(Snyder 2014). Some European states, such as Germany, have pushed for quick 
financial aid to Ukraine with the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). After 
negotiations, a variation of this proposal began to be implemented. This plan would 
include money from both the IMF and the EU, equaling a total of 4.6 billion dollars 
(2.87 billion euros). This step is interesting because it is such a large amount of money. 
The European Council (EC) commented regarding the financial package: 
"Unprecedented levels of EU aid will be disbursed in a timely manner” (Morris 2014). 
Over half of this financial package will be made up of a loan for 1.6 billion euros that is 
to be used “to help it pay off some of its debts as well as supporting economic reforms” 
(Price 2014). Most of the rest of the money will go toward development assistance and 
to pay for the gas deal with Russia that will serve both Ukraine and EU countries. Some 
of the financial assistance comes in the form of indirect money, meaning that instead of 
giving money in loans directly to Ukraine, the EU will reduce costs for Ukraine on 
another front. In this case, the EU removed customs duties on exports from Ukraine to 
the EU.  
Another major action that the EU has taken in response to the crisis in Ukraine 
is to act as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, especially regarding negotiations 
over the gas pipeline. While the EU has been labeled as having this role, the actual 
negotiator(s) present have often been Germany’s prime minister and, on occasion, the 
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prime ministers of France and/or the UK. For example, at one point BBC reported: 
“Earlier, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was reported to have called Ms 
Tymoshenko and urged her to work for unity. Mrs Merkel also called Russian President 
Vladimir Putin on Sunday to discuss the crisis; both agreed that the country's ‘territorial 
integrity must be safeguarded’” (“Ukraine: Interim Leader Turchynov Stresses 
‘European Choice’” 2014). Germany, and by extension the EU, is trying not only to 
help Ukraine reach an agreement with Russia, but also to negotiate the status of Ukraine 
between the EU and Russia. A later article confirmed this idea by stating, “Germany is 
trying to act as a broker in the conflict and to assuage Russian fears that it will be 
threatened if Ukraine moves closer to the European Union” (“Ukraine: Interim Leader 
Turchynov Stresses ‘European Choice’” 2014). Thus, while Germany may be acting as 
a mediator between the two countries, it is also trying to further its own interests and 
those of the EU. 
However, Germany has not acted completely alone. The EU as a whole, through 
various EU organizations, has actually brokered some of the negotiations. For example, 
the EU in the form of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
has played a major role in negotiating ceasefires between Ukraine and Russia. Although 
the ceasefires themselves have not proven very effective, what is important is that the 
EU has sought such a major role in the negotiations. The EU has also played this role in 
the discussion of the gas deal between Ukraine and Russia. When the deal was reached, 
news sources reported it by saying: “Russia has agreed to resume gas supplies to 
Ukraine over the winter in a deal brokered by the European Union” (“Russia-Ukraine 
Gas Deal Secures EU Winter Supply” 2014). Another article made a similar comment, 
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stating: “The deal follows months of talks between EU officials and the Russian and 
Ukrainian energy ministers. The terms include the EU acting as guarantor for Ukraine's 
gas purchases from Russia and helping to meet outstanding debts” (“Russia-Ukraine 
Gas Deal Secures EU Winter Supply” 2014). In fact, discussions of the deal between 
the two countries are rarely mentioned without at least some reference to the role of the 
EU in its formation.  
This move by the EU to become even more involved in the conflict within 
Ukraine between Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces and, by extension, between Ukraine 
and Russia has not been seen without a certain degree of skepticism. For example, one 
article reports the following concern: “If the EU is setting itself up as the guarantor 
power for Ukraine . . . in the face of lasting opposition from Moscow, ‘there is already a 
sense creeping into the foreign policy crowd that Europeans may have bitten off more 
than they can chew’” (Morris 2014).  The article notes that while there are many who 
may not share these same concerns, the reality of the matter is that either way “this is 
new and uncharted territory for the European Union” (Morris 2014).  
One of the most recent actions taken by the EU in Ukraine has been to 
commission and send an EEAS mission, known as a European Union Action Mission 
(EUAM), to the country. This program was set to start in January 2015 and the mission 
will stay in Ukraine for a couple of years. Missions like this one are not necessarily new 
ground for the EU, but are nonetheless a relatively recent development in their foreign 
policy approach. News articles discuss the operation only briefly as a type of “support 
group” (Price 2014) designed to help with “reforming the political and economic 
systems in the country” (Price 2014). A large number of the staff is from EU countries, 
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the rest coming from all corners of the globe. The primary goal of the EUAM is to help 
Ukraine “reform its civilian security sector – police, border authorities, intelligence 
services, and justice system” (EUAM Ukraine Explained 2014).  They intend to do this 
by providing ‘strategic advice’ to relevant officials. By going through this process, 
Ukraine and the EUAM hope to foster trust between the people of Ukraine and their 
country’s security forces as well as to bring Ukraine’s standards in this area closer to 
those of the EU.  
Another major response to the crisis in Ukraine is the signing of the Association 
Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The Association Agreement has been 
complete since 2011, but was not signed until about a year ago. Association 
Agreements are an important part of EU foreign relations and are designed to set up a 
thorough bilateral arrangement between the EU and another country. They can, as in the 
case of Ukraine, prepare a country for future entry in to the EU, but they also address 
many other aspects. For example, an Association Agreement must intend to establish 
close economic and political cooperation, create bodies for the management of the 
cooperation, create a privileged relationship between the European Union and its 
partner, and address human rights standards (“Association Agreements”). In many cases 
the Association Agreement will replace a previous Cooperation Agreement (a 
predecessor of the Association Agreement).  
The EU offered the document to be signed by Ukraine in 2013, but the country’s 
president at the time refused, preferring a trade deal with Russia. The people’s 
frustration over this decision led to most of the initial conflict. Following the accession 
of the interim President, the EU and Ukraine moved to begin the process of signing and 
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implementing the Association Agreement.  In March 2014, the political provisions of 
the Association Agreement were signed, leading to the signing of the full agreement in 
June 2014 after the new President Petro Poroshenko was in office. The Association 
Agreement includes the implementation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
as well as “support to core reforms, economic recovery and growth, and governance and 
sector cooperation in areas such as energy, transport and environment protection, 
industrial cooperation, social development and protection, equal rights, consumer 
protection, education, youth, and cultural cooperation” (“EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement: ‘What Does the Agreement Offer?’”). The EU website states that it “is 
unprecedented in its breadth (number of areas covered) and depth (detail of 
commitments and timelines)” (“A Look at the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement”). 
The implementation of this agreement has also been a big step in redefining Ukraine’s 
place in the ENP and as a possible candidate for entrance into the EU. “Economically 
these eastern neighbours of the EU have lagged behind other former communist bloc 
countries which joined the EU in the past decade. So economic integration is a big step 
towards possible EU membership in future” (Peter 2014). It is important to note that 
Ukraine is not the only country that signed such an agreement; this document in 
particular also includes Georgia and Moldova in the arrangement. These economic 
partnerships are strongly opposed by Russia (Peter 2014). The conflict in Ukraine thus 
forced the EU to reconsider such an agreement as well as to make a decision on taking 
more formal steps toward integration. 
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Case Study: The Syrian Crisis (2011-Present) 
The second case study that I will be looking at is that of the European Union and 
Syria. This case presents a good example of the EU’s response to a foreign policy crisis 
that is farther away from the member states that currently constitute the European 
Union. While the countries in the EU, as a whole and individually, have interests in 
Syria, the latter is not a country with which the EU has ever been especially closely 
connected. So, although the unrest caused by the crisis in Syria certainly has effects on 
the EU, and by extension on its foreign policy in that area, the crisis there is not likely 
to spill over into the EU as the one in Ukraine might do.  
Although Syria is also within relatively close proximity to several EU countries 
and is part of the European Neighborhood Policy, it is largely defined as being within 
the orbit of the Middle East and the crisis there is defined as Middle Eastern rather than 
European. The international attention to the crisis is large, as recognized by the EU 
website, which states: “By 2014, the Syria crisis had become the largest humanitarian 
and security disaster in the world” (“The EU's Relations with Syria”). This statement 
clearly indicates that the situation in Syria is an issue that concerns the entire 
international community, and the responsibility for dealing with the problem is not 
viewed as being associated with any one group of countries.  
European Union-Syrian Relations (1977-2011) 
Relations between the EU and Syria have been historically shaky at best and 
practically undefined at worst. The foundation of the EU’s foreign policy in regards to 
Syria today is still based on the Cooperation Agreement between the Syrian government 
and the EEC signed in 1977. The agreement took the form of a traditional international 
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treaty, with each EEC country signing separately, and focused almost solely on setting 
up a trade agreement between the signatory countries and on providing development aid 
to Syria. Article one of the agreement clearly lays out its purpose. 
“The object of this Agreement between the Community and Syria is to 
promote overall cooperation between the Contracting Parties with a view 
to contributing to the economic and social development of Syria and 
helping to strengthen relations between the Parties. To this end 
provisions and measures will be adopted and implemented in the fields 
of economic, technical and financial cooperation and of trade” 
(“Cooperation Agreement” 1977). 
This agreement was amended twice in 1986 and 1994, and is likely to accommodate 
changes within the structure of EU foreign policy making. In 1995, the Barcelona 
Process began to prescribe development aid to Syria, leaving the Cooperation 
Agreement to focus only on the trade relationship.  Since 1995, relations between the 
EU and Syria have been essentially static. In 2008, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EUROMED), as a section of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), replaced the 
Barcelona Process. However, this change had very little effect on relations with Syria as 
its membership in the ENP was already suspended due to unrest in the area before the 
current crisis and to generally poor relations with the EU.  The Association Agreement 
was negotiated between the two countries over the course of six years between 1998 
and 2004; however, it was never signed or implemented. Twice, once in 2004 and once 
in 2009, the agreement came close to being signed, but at both times the EU or Syria 
decided to put off finalizing the agreement.  Had it been signed, it would have focused 
on three main areas: political relations, economy and trade relations, and cooperation. It 
also would have involved a regular political dialogue between the two parties, the 
creation of a free-trade area and the implementation of economic reforms, and 
cooperation “ranging from education and scientific cooperation, over cultural heritage 
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and environmental protection, to health, agriculture, investment and the fight against 
organised crime” (“European-Syrian Cooperation Agreement”). Previous to the 
outbreak of the civil war in Syria, this agreement exemplified the direction of EU 
foreign policy toward Syria.   
The Crisis in Syria (2011-Present) 
The current crisis in Syria has been ongoing since March 2011 and has evolved 
to become increasingly more complicated over time. The conflict began when the 
government of Syria fired on peaceful protestors in Deraa (a city in Southern Syria). 
These protests were primarily motivated by the people’s dissatisfaction with Syria’s 
president, Bashar Al-Assad. When he made no move to step aside, the protests devolved 
into violence between the protestors and the police. By November 2011, the crisis had 
become more militarized with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) attempting to topple the 
Assad regime by force.  In June 2012, the conflict began to actively bleed into 
surrounding countries, particularly Turkey. This increased level of violence attracted the 
attention of several other countries and international entities, such as the UN. In 
November 2013, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition 
Forces was formed as an opposition government, and by December the US, Britain, 
France, Turkey, and the Gulf states recognized the Coalition as a legitimate force. The 
first large amounts of aid from international donors were pledged to relief aid for Syria 
at the beginning of 2013. This action reflected increased international concern over the 
crisis in Syria. In June 2014, the situation was further complicated by the declaration of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or IS), with territorial claims extending from 
Aleppo in northwestern Syria to eastern Iraq. This declaration not only put ISIS in the 
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middle of the civil war in Syria, but also caught the attention of many other countries 
who were apprehensive about the sudden rise of such a powerful extremist group. The 
introduction of this third factor created a new level of challenge in the conflict in Syria, 
leading to increased concern from international powers.  
At this point, the crisis became a three-way civil war between the government of 
Syria, the Free Syrian Army and National Coalition, and ISIS. The actions of the 
government of Syria under President Assad have remained relatively confined within 
the borders of Syria; however, the actions of the other two groups have involved several 
other countries. The Free Syrian Army, for example, is based in Turkey where it first 
came together in the capital of Istanbul. Similarly, the National Coalition was formed 
by a group of Syrians in Qatar. It is unclear at this point exactly where ISIS originated 
but it maintains some of its largest strongholds in Syria and Iran, as well as in a few 
other Middle Eastern countries. The civil war in Syria has left no area of the country 
untouched and has even sparked a few skirmishes with Turkey. The goals of the three 
main entities differ greatly, with the Syrian government attempting to keep President 
Assad in power, the FSA and National Coalition attempting to create a democratic 
government, and ISIS planning to create a caliphate, or an area ruled according to 
Muslim law (“Guide: Syrian Crisis” 2012).  
Issues of Concern to the European Union in Syria 
Several issues pertaining to the situation in Syria concern the EU as a whole. 
Three primary issues have occupied most of the EU’s attention: refugees, relations with 
Turkey, and security concerns. As for the first, the crisis has led to an enormous number 
of refugees and displaced people. As of October 2014, the EU believed that about 9 
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million Syrians had fled their country since the beginning of the crisis in March 2011. 
Of those refugees, over 6 million remain displaced in Syria and about 1/3 have sought 
refuge in surrounding countries, such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq (See Figure 
3). The number of refugees, especially in Turkey, has been a major concern for the EU, 
partly because many of these refugees cross Turkey’s Western border into the EU 
through Bulgaria, an EU member state. Many of the refugees in camps in Turkey and 
Bulgaria are trying not only to receive help, but also to officially enter the EU in order 
to have access to better opportunities. This situation concerns the EU due to the number 
of refugees attempting entrance into the region, and also because the situation creates 
challenges for the EU’s relationship with Turkey. This is the second issue of concern 
coming out the crisis in Syria (“Syrian Refugees” 2013). 
The EU is very closely tied to Turkey for several reasons, one being the fact that 
Turkey is a prospective member state that is in the process of applying to join. 
Furthermore, Turkey has long been an important ally for many other reasons. According 
to one EU news report, “Turkey is a key partner for the European Union as an active 
regional foreign policy player, with a strategic location, including for the EU's energy 
security” (“Turkey Visit Underlines Joint Action on EU External Relations” 2014). 
Maintaining good relations with Turkey forces the EU to take a stance on the Syrian 
crisis and to provide some kind of assistance. Since the EU has accepted a relatively 
small number of refugees, most of the latter have been forced to remain in Turkey, 
which does not have sufficient means to support them. Of the approximately 3 million 
refugees who sought safety in surrounding countries, 1 million are in Turkey. One EU 
report stated that by summer 2014 Turkey had spent over $2.5 billion on camps and 
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other necessities for the refugees. Thus, Turkey has been propositioning the EU and 
other international entities not only to take on more refugees, but also for greater 
monetary support. Since Turkey is a prospective EU member, the EU cannot ignore 
these requests (“Syrian Refugees” 2013).  
The third major concern of the EU in regard to the Syrian crisis is the 
contribution of the conflict in Syria to security concerns associated with terrorism. This 
concern stems from the reality that many European citizens going to Syria to join the 
fighting there may pose a threat to their home countries on their return. A news source 
comments, “the influx of European fighters into Syria is unprecedented” (Pizzi 2014). 
Europol expands on this concern: 
“European fighters, who travel to conflict zones, are assessed as posing 
an increased threat to all EU Member States on their return. They may 
seek to set up logistical, financial or recruitment cells, and may act as 
role models to individuals within extremist communities – further 
enhancing their capacity to encourage others to travel. In addition, their 
resolve is likely to have strengthened in the conflict zones, and they may 
have gained the skills and contacts to carry out attacks in the EU” 
(“Returning Fighters from Syrian Conflict Cause Concern in the EU” 
2014).  
It is unclear how many European fighters are in Syria. They have joined all sides of the 
conflict, including the ISIS. Already, there have been several arrests and convictions of 
such ‘returned’ fighters and those that recruit them (See Figure 6). However, the EU 
anticipates that the longer the conflict persists, the more people will go to Syria to fight, 
and consequently the greater the number of EU citizens with fanatical intentions who 
will return (“Returning Fighters from Syrian Conflict Cause Concern in the EU” 2014).  
This situation not only causes concern amongst European citizens, but also leads to 
instability in a variety of sectors dealing with EU internal security. 
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The European Union Response to the Syrian Crisis 
This leads to the question: what actions is the EU taking in response to the 
Syrian crisis? Unlike the situation in Ukraine, which has been described as a revolution 
in EU foreign policy, most commentators claim that the EU response in Syria is 
deficient. This is not to say, however, that the EU is not taking any action in Syria, but 
that the nature and level of the actions taken are different from those taken in response 
to the crisis in Ukraine. The EU has focused its efforts on freezing previous agreements 
with Syria, providing humanitarian aid, exerting political pressure, modifying refugee 
policies, implementing sanctions, and realizing anti-terrorism measures.  
The first collective action taken by the EU was to retract and put on hold several 
agreements that the EU had with Syria. For example, at the beginning of the conflict, 
many of the previous agreements for monetary assistance and aid to the Syrian 
government were terminated or put on hold. In May 2011, one of the several 
conclusions adopted by the Council of the EU in response to the crisis in Syria stated 
“the EU has decided to suspend all preparations in relation to new bilateral cooperation 
programs and to suspend the ongoing bilateral programs with the Syrian authorities 
under ENPI and MEDA instruments” (“Council Conclusions on Syria” 2011). These 
bilateral aid programs were guided by the instruments of the ENP and have been among 
the more notable manifestations of EU-Syrian relations. The Council also stated that it 
would not consider signing the new version of the Association Agreement at that time 
either. Depending on the future status of the crisis in Syria, more measures may be 
taken and further community aid may be stopped, a threat that would be carried out in 
the next few years through various restrictive actions.  
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Another early action that the EU took in response to the Syrian crisis was to 
impose a variety of sanctions and other restrictions on the Syrian government as well as 
on some individuals and economic sectors, such as trade. From the beginning of the 
conflict in March 2011, the EU had been creating and pushing for sanctions on Syria. 
Initially, the EU focused not only on implementing its own sanctions, but also on 
encouraging other international entities, such as the UN, to do so as well. Although 
trade with Syria does not make up a large part of the EU’s economy, it is critical for 
Syria. Thus, the sanctions and restrictions have the capability to be seriously damaging 
to the Syrian economy. The sanctions, which began in 2011, involve travel bans and 
asset freezes affecting over 120 people and 40 companies. “These include President 
Assad and most of his close family, the Syrian Central Bank and senior officials, 
including seven ministers” (“Q&A: Syria Sanctions” 2012). These sanctions also 
involve a ban on crude oil imports, an arms embargo, and a block on trade in gold, 
precious metals, and diamonds. It is believed that the ban on oil imports will have the 
greatest effect. One news article supports this conclusion, stating: “The EU's oil import 
ban is likely to hit Syria's economy hardest. Oil revenues account for around 20% of 
Syrian GDP. Before the EU ban, 90% of oil exports went to the EU, mainly to 
Germany, Italy and France” (“Q&A: Syria Sanctions” 2012). For this reason, the EU 
had good reason to believe that sanctions would put the desired pressure on the Syrian 
government in hopes of bringing an end to the conflict.  
However, as the conflict became more complicated with the introduction of an 
organized and recognized opposition and ISIS, some of these measures were 
reevaluated in 2013. After an EU meeting in Brussels, the EU issued a declaration 
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dictating that all sanctions and restrictions would continue with the exception of the 
arms embargo, which would then be lifted. Now instead of not permitting any weapons 
into Syria, the EU decided that “Member states can now decide their own policy on 
sending arms to Syria, but agreed not to ‘proceed at this stage with the delivery’ of 
equipment” (“EU Ends Arms Embargo on Syrian Rebels” 2013). Ending the arms 
embargo was something that many influential EU countries had been considering for 
several months. Britain was especially vocal about its desire to end the embargo. 
However, some other EU countries, such as the Czech Republic, were not in favor of 
ending the embargo. This standstill led to the decision not to send any military 
equipment to Syria regardless of the technical end of the embargo. As a BBC news 
report on the declaration comments, “it is clear that the EU decision will not make much 
difference on the ground in the immediate future” (“EU Ends Arms Embargo on Syrian 
Rebels” 2013).  
The main action that the EU has taken in regards to the Syrian crisis is to 
provide humanitarian aid, primarily through monetary means. Monetarily, the EU as a 
whole has given the most aid to victims of the Syrian crisis, greater even than the 
United States. As of 2015, the EU had dedicated 2,900,000,000 euros (currently about 
$3,103,000,000). This number is a couple of million euros more than what the US 
provided. According to the EU delegation in the US, the “bulk of the resources 
allocated early on in the crisis have helped refugees inside camps. In 2014 the focus has 
primarily been to support refugees living outside camps, in particular new arrivals” 
(“Syrian Refugees” 2013). Since 2012, large proportions of aid have also gone to 
support the provision and allocation of medical care and supplies, food, shelter, water, 
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sanitation, and psychological support for refugees and displaced people, both inside and 
outside of Syria (“Syrian Refugees” 2013). Some of the aid has also gone to fund basic 
education for young Syrian refugees. This pattern of aid will continue over the next 
couple of years. One program that is currently being planned will give around 40 
million euros “aimed at enhancing access to services, strengthening resilience of host 
communities as well as facilitating integration of refugees. It will also be supporting 
direct capacity-building for the Turkish Government in migration management” 
(“Syrian Refugees” 2013). Beyond this more direct aid to Syria and Syrian refugees, the 
EU has also given money to help Turkey support the large number of Syrian refugees 
residing in their country. The purpose of this aid was described as follows: “With 
growing numbers of refugees from Syria seeking sanctuary in Turkey, the European 
Commission is stepping up its assistance with an additional €10 million in humanitarian 
funding both inside Turkey and inside Syria via cross-border assistance from Turkey” 
(“Syrian Refugees” 2013). Some of the aid money is also used to fund a physical EU 
presence of humanitarian experts in Turkey to monitor the crisis in Syria and the 
refugee situation in Turkey. Beyond purely humanitarian aid, the EU has also given 
funds to provide assistance for the international effort to remove and destroy the 
chemical weapons held by the Syrian government. This removal was finally completed 
in June 2014 by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
and the United Nations (UN).  
In addition to physical and economic measures, the EU has also attempted to 
pressure Syria politically into changing their tactics by condemning various actions 
taken by the Syrian government. For example, early on in the conflict, one news source 
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stated: “Five EU nations have summoned Syrian ambassadors to condemn Damascus' 
recent violent crackdown on anti-government protesters” (“Syria: EU Nations Summon 
Syrian Envoys over Crackdown” 2011). An early conclusion by the Council included 
eight points, five of which were dedicated purely to condemning the actions of the 
Syrian government against its own people (“Council Conclusions on Syria” 2011). This 
trend continued during the chemical weapon attack, where even after their removal, the 
EU continued to maintain “pressure on the country to ensure that its chemical weapons 
programme is completely and irreversibly dismantled” (“The EU’s Relations with 
Syria”). Despite the EU’s intention to pressure Syria into abandoning chemical 
weapons, its efforts in this instance remain financial in nature. While this tactic is one 
that is nearly always used by all organizations and governments, what is interesting here 
is the use of this tactic as an acknowledged response to the situation.  
Another main response to the Syrian crisis has been to implement new policies 
and quotas for refugees in European countries. With Turkey as a major destination for 
displaced people, many refugees attempt to either cross the border from Turkey to 
Bulgaria illegally or to apply for legal refugee status in the EU. Some countries within 
the EU have been more open to accepting refugees than others. For example, Germany 
and Sweden have both made moves to accommodate large numbers of refugees, while 
countries such as Lithuania and Estonia have not. Many EU countries have expanded 
quotas either for refugees in general or for Syrian refugees specifically to allow more of 
them to apply for and locate temporary or permanent residence in the country. For 
example, in 2013 Austria increased the quota for Syrian refugees by 1,000 spaces 
(“Syrian Refugees” 2013), and a total of ten EU countries had followed suit by 2013 
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(“EU Slammed by Amnesty over ‘Pitiful’ Syrian Refugee Response” 2013). By far the 
leaders in taking in refugees have been Germany and Sweden (See Figure 4). Since 
2013, Germany alone has pledged to take in 30,030 Syrian refugees through a variety of 
means and in several degrees of permanent settlement. Several other EU countries have 
agreed to take on anywhere between around 70 to a couple of thousand refugees 
(“Syrian Refugees” 2013). However, as a whole, the EU response to refugees has been 
two sided. While “the EU has accepted the vast majority of Syrians who have applied 
for asylum, it has to date received relatively few requests. Its response to a UNHCR call 
for more than 130,000 resettlement spots for Syrian refugees between 2013-2016 has 
also been tepid” (“Syrian Refugees” 2013). There are also some complaints that the 
refugees in some countries, such as Greece and Bulgaria, are not treated well. 
Nonetheless, over 55,000 Syrian refugees have been successful in achieving some level 
of asylum in the EU (“EU Slammed by Amnesty over ‘Pitiful’ Syrian Refugee 
Response” 2013). The status of refugees does not involve official EU policy or EU 
demand for action by member states, but is rather determined individually by many of 
the largest and leading EU states. While being left up to the individual countries, actions 
deriving from such refugee policies have been generally supported and encouraged by 
the EU.    
One of the most recent actions taken by the EU in response to the crisis in Syria 
has been to implement more anti-terrorism measures. In January of 2014, as concerns 
over possible terrorist attacks in the EU by returned fighters from Syria increased, the 
EU decided to update its strategy for combatting radicalization and recruitment of 
extremists. The initial proposal issued by the Commission called for holding a 
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conference led by the EU’s Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) on foreign 
fighters in Syria. RAN is a group set up by the EU as a part of its counter-terrorism 
strategy, focusing on preventing EU citizens from becoming involved in extremist 
groups or convincing them to stop participating in such activities (“Radicalization 
Awareness Network [RAN]” 2015). The purpose of this conference was described as 
follows  
“This conference will bring together representatives of all relevant 
sectors (law enforcement, healthcare, etc.) from the cities in the EU 
where foreign fighters are causing the most concern. Local practitioners 
and national experts will share practices and exchange ideas on 
preventing potential fighters from going to Syria and engaging with 
foreign fighters after they return” (“Radicalization Awareness Network 
[RAN]” 2015).  
 
Following this conference, in summer 2014, the EU decided to create an action plan in 
order to “combat the threat posed by returned fighters” (Pizzi 2014). This action plan is 
still incomplete and continues to be a point of discussion among European leaders and 
RAN in 2015. The initial idea behind that plan was to set up a system that “would 
encourage the sharing of intelligence across borders to enforce travel bans and track 
suspects” (Pizzi 2014). These measures would target specifically lone wolf’ terror 
suspects, or those that work alone to carry out acts of terrorism.   
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Conclusions 
The case studies of the current crises in Ukraine and Syria both present two 
different and pertinent examples of the varying foreign policy strategies employed by 
the EU. In response to the civil war in Syria, the EU focused its efforts on freezing 
previous agreements with Syria, providing humanitarian aid, exerting political pressure, 
modifying refugee policies, implementing sanctions, and realizing anti-terrorism 
measures. In response to the situation in Ukraine, by contrast, the EU imposed sanctions 
on pro-separatist Ukrainian and Russian officials, provided monetary assistance to the 
government of Ukraine, served as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia, provided on-
the-ground help through an European Union Action Mission (EUAM), and put changes 
to the ENP and Association Agreement into motion.  
In some ways the EU’s response to these two situations was similar. For 
example, in both cases one of the earliest responses was to pull away from the situation 
and to impose sanctions. In the case of Syria, the negative reaction was even more 
extreme, with the EU completely ceasing all negotiations and agreements with the 
Syrian government. In both cases the EU also moved toward a more positive approach 
as the crises continued, often turning toward providing some kind of monetary 
assistance and taking diplomatic measures. However, the nature of these methods varied 
fairly significantly between the two. The EU also took some actions that did not overlap 
between the two cases, such as the anti-terrorism and refugee policies in the Syrian case 
and the presence of the EUAM and the signing of the Association Agreement in the 
Ukrainian case.  
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Fundamentally, the EU’s response to the crisis in Syria presented a much more 
removed approach that focused on creating change through policies internal to the EU, 
while their response to the crisis in Ukraine proved to be a much more invasive and 
proactive policy approach. All of the actions taken in the Syrian case fall into one of 
two categories: either they are ones that can be taken safely from afar and do not require 
any direct intervention, or they are internal measures taken by either the EU as a whole 
or by individual member states. The sanctions, humanitarian aid, political pressure, and 
the end of the agreements with Syria are all actions that do not require direct 
intervention or contact of any kind. The EU can judge from afar measures that need to 
be taken and implement these or, in the case of the agreements, the EU stops an action 
completely. Some of these actions, especially ending the agreements, could also have 
negative long-term consequences permanently affecting relations with Syria depending 
on how the conflict ends. The refugee and anti-terrorism policies affect foreign relations 
and are felt by the other countries.  However, the measures are largely internal applying 
only to the EU member states themselves. So instead of preventing or encouraging the 
other party from doing an action, the EU prevents or allows its members to undertake an 
action. However, in either case such responses do not require the cooperation or consent 
of the other parties involved and are, in that way, removed.  
In the case of Ukraine, quite the opposite is true. While some EU actions 
function primarily from afar, such as sanctions and monetary assistance, the EU also 
voluntarily immerses itself in the crisis. It sends a EUAM to Ukraine to help the 
government, it actively becomes involved mediating negotiations between Ukraine and 
Russia, and it enters into a long-term economic and cooperative agreement. These 
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actions require a great deal of effort on the part of the EU and require it to send people 
into the conflict and take greater risks with long lasting agreements. In this case, one 
could almost argue that the EU is an equal actor in the conflict with Russia, which is 
actually directly involved. These actions are also more focused on maintaining or 
creating permanent relations with the parties involved. It is necessary for the EU to 
maintain close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and this necessity is evident in 
the EU’s actions. 
The crises in Syria and Ukraine represent only two examples of how the EU 
reacts to events with serious foreign policy implications, and thus cannot reveal a 
concrete trend. However, such reactions can reveal tendencies that have significance for 
understanding how the EU responds to international issues. More situations would have 
to be studied in order to form a solid conclusion, but these two situations are enough to 
present a hypothesis on the tendencies of the European Union’s foreign policy 
strategies.  
From these two scenarios it can be hypothesized that the foreign policy 
strategies used by the EU will be different depending on how distant the situation is 
from the countries of the EU and their day-to-day functions. The strategies used in 
issues that are closer to home will be interventionist and would appear to focus on 
maintaining or facilitating close relations between the EU and the parties involved.  
Helping to resolve the crisis and to prevent further devolution of the situation would be 
a priority in such cases. On the other hand, issues that are a bit more removed from the 
EU will involve generally less direct action, but also more actions that could result in 
negative political consequences.  I think that this difference exists because even though 
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the EU may have interests in countries or areas more removed from themselves, such as 
Syria, these interests will not outweigh their desire to not get involved in a crisis for 
which they have no ‘ownership’. They have relations with that country, and want to 
continue those relations, but since the problem is not “theirs” they will react in a less 
interventionist manner. On the other hand, responses to issues close to home may be 
more positive and may focus on assistance because these are issues that the EU cannot 
avoid. The wrong move, or even no move, could cause serious repercussions in their 
backyard.
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Appendix 
List of Abbreviations  
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy 
EEAS – European External Action Services 
EDC – Economic Defense Community 
EEC – European Economic Community 
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy 
EPC – European Political Cooperation 
EU – European Union 
EUAM – European Union Action Mission 
EUROMED – Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
EUSR – European Union Special Representative  
FSA – Free Syrian Army 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
ISIS/IS – Islamic State 
JHA – Justice and Home Affairs 
MEP – Member of the European Parliament  
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OPCW – Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
RAN – Radicalization Awareness Network 
SEA – Single European Act 
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UN – United Nations 
US – United States   
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Figure 1: Map of Ukraine    
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Figure 2: Map of Gas Pipelines   
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Figure 3: Map of Syria Showing Refugees    
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Figure 4: Graphs, and Charts Showing Aid and Refugee Applications from the 
Syrian Crisis 
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Figure 5:  Diagram of the Structure of EEAS 
          
 
 
51 
 
Figure 6: Map of Arrested Terrorist Suspects in the EU    
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